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TOWARDS A SEMANTICS FOR MASS EXPRESSIONS  
DERIVED FROM GRADABLE EXPRESSIONS
ABSTRACT
What semantics should we attribute to mass expressions like wisdom and 
love, which are derived from gradable expressions (wise, to love)? We first 
examine how these expressions are used, then how they are interpreted in their 
various uses. We show in particular that, just like with ordinary concrete mass 
nouns (wine, furniture), sentences where they appear are liable to distributive, 
collective, and intermediate construals. We then propose a model to account for 
these data, in which derived mass expressions denote instances of properties. 
The model is general enough to apply both to concrete and derived mass nouns. 
This establishes that mass nouns have a uniform semantics. Another feature of 
the account is that, to explain the gradability of mass expressions, it makes use 
of degrees and measure functions only when these are overtly expressed, in 
expressions like a lot of wisdom and two litres of wine.
KEYWORDS
Mass nouns, nominalization, properties, gradability, distributivity.
164 DAVID NICOLAS
The topic of this paper is the following1: what semantics should we 
attribute to mass expressions derived from gradable expressions, i.e. from 
adjectives and verbal expressions that accept the comparatives more and less:
(1) Julie showed more wisdom than Fred.
(2) Julie loved Fred less than Tom.
From the adjective wise and the verb to love, English has formed the 
nominal expressions wisdom and love. Other examples of such pairs include 
sad m sadness, hostile m hostility, to respect m respect, to work m work.
Semantic studies about mass nouns have concentrated on concrete mass 
nouns like wine or furniture. (For reviews of the literature, see Pelletier & 
Schubert, 1989; Krifka, 1991; and Nicolas, 2002a.) But they have said nothing 
concerning mass expressions like wisdom or love. This raises an important 
question: are derived mass nouns a separate species of mass nouns, with their 
own semantic properties? Or can a general account be proposed, which would 
work both for concrete mass nouns and derived ones?
Studying the semantics of derived mass nouns forces us to take a more 
general stance than when focusing on concrete mass nouns alone. Several 
issues arise:
– Reference: concrete common nouns can be used in definite descriptions, 
where they seem to refer to entities of various types. Do derived mass nouns 
refer to something when they are used in definite descriptions? And if so, what 
do they refer to?
– Distributive, collective, and intermediate construals: sentences with 
concrete mass nouns or plurals may receive so-called distributive, collective, 
and intermediate construals. Is it also the case with derived mass nouns?
– Gradability: in all the major parts of speech, we find expressions that 
are gradable, i.e. expressions that accept the comparatives more and less. How 
should we account for gradability?
– Nominalization: what is the semantic effect of nominalization? In 
other words, how is the semantics of a derived mass noun linked to that of the 
gradable adjective or verb it is derived from?
In what follows, we propose a model for the semantics of derived mass 
nouns, in which each of these issues is given a certain solution. Our aim is 
not so much to argue extensively for these solutions, but rather to sketch a 
general model that is both coherent and plausible. (By doing so, at the very 
1. For comments and criticisms, I would like to thank Francis Corblin, Paul Egré, 
Brendan Gillon, Jacques Jayez, Friederike Moltmann, Philippe Schlenker, Benjamin Spector, 
Arnim von Stechow, Lucia Tovena, and anonymous reviewers. Barring subsequent slight 
revisions, this paper was completed by February 2006. For various reasons, its publication 
will have taken a long time.
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least, we want to make clear what theoretical choices have to be made before a 
semantics for derived mass nouns can be proposed.) We show that some of the 
proposals that have been made when focusing on concrete mass nouns can also 
be applied when considering derived mass nouns. This, we hold, is neither a 
futile exercise nor a trivial result: nothing guarantees whether this can be done 
successfully. Models that have been proposed for the semantics of mass nouns 
are general enough only if they apply to concrete mass nouns and to derived 
mass nouns alike. Whether this is so must be established, not assumed.2
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by identifying the 
distribution of the class of nominal expressions that we are interested in. We 
then look at the interpretations that these nouns can receive in their various 
uses. These first two sections are thus descriptive: they aim at describing what 
the data concerning use and interpretation are, in a theory neutral way. We then 
look for a model that can account for these data.
1. The uses of mass expressions derived from gradable expressions
We look at cases in which a gradable expression (like a gradable 
adjective or a gradable verbal expression) gives rise, through nominalization, 
to a nominal expression that behaves morphosyntactically like a mass noun 
(like wine or furniture).3 This means that the nominal expression can be used 
in the following ways.
2. The work presented in this paper builds on previous research by the author 
(Nicolas, 2002a; 2002b; 2004). In Nicolas (2004), the object of study was mass nouns 
derived from gradable adjectives. Here, it is, more generally, mass nouns derived from 
gradable (adjectival and verbal) expressions. The empirical coverage is thus extended. 
The data concerning how derived mass nouns are understood in their various uses is also 
presented in much more detail in section 2. In particular, it is shown for the first time that 
derived mass nouns are susceptible to distributive, collective, and intermediate construals 
(modulo lexical constraints, knowledge of the world and context of speech). The theoretical 
coverage is also largely extended in section 2, concerning notably reference, distributive, 
collective, and intermediate construals, and gradability.
3. In many languages, including English, most common nouns divide into two 
morphosyntactic subclasses, mass nouns and count nouns (Gillon, 1992). A defining 
characteristic of mass nouns, like milk, is that they are invariable, while count nouns, 
like cat, can be used in the singular and in the plural. Depending on the language, this 
basic morphosyntactic difference between the two types of noun is often supplemented by 
differences as to the determiners they can combine with. Thus, in English, mass nouns can be 
used with determiners like much and a lot of, but neither with one nor many. On the contrary, 
count nouns can be employed with numerals like one and determiners like many, but not 
with much.
It is of course well known that mass nouns can, in certain contexts, be used as count 
nouns (You should take a hot milk with some honey), and vice versa (You will find a lot of 
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First, it can appear together with a possessive phrase: Julie’s wisdom, 
the love of Julie for Tom, or in a definite nominal expression with a relative 
(non-possessive) phrase: the wisdom that Julie showed on that occasion, the 
love that Julie felt for Tom.
Second, it can appear together with an indefinite, mass determiner like 
a lot of or much:
(3) Julie showed a lot of wisdom in that occasion.
(4) Julie did not feel much love for Tom.
Third, it can appear in comparative constructions, its grammatical number 
being singular:
(5) Julie showed more wisdom than Fred did on that occasion.
(6) Julie had more love for Tom than for Fred.
Fourth, it can be used without any determiner, in sentences that are not 
comparative:
(7)  Wisdom is rare.
(8)  Julie encountered love.
Fifth, it is in general invariable in grammatical number. It seems hard, for 
instance, to talk of wisdoms or loves for Fred. Doing so requires a special 
context and induces a change in meaning. Finally, it may sometimes be used 
together with a count determiner, notably in expressions of the form [a(n) + 
adjective + nominal expression]: a great wisdom / an incredible love. (In 
particular, for process verbs like to work, it is well known that nominalization 
often gives rise both to a mass noun that denotes the process, and to a count 
noun that denotes the result of the process as in: This is such a great work.)
Can the class of expressions that give rise to mass expressions be 
characterized more precisely? Since a mass expression is gradable (it can 
be combined with comparatives when employed normally in the singular), 
this must also be the case with the original expression. Thus, if the original 
expression is an adjective, it must be a gradable one (wiser / less wise). 
rabbit around here). One then talks of conversion. Conversion is a common grammatical 
possibility, whereby a member of a grammatical category is used in the morphosyntactic 
environment characteristic of another grammatical category. For instance, proper names can 
be used as common nouns: The professor has two Picassos in his class (cf. Gillon, 1992; 
Kleiber, 1994). Uses of nominal expressions like love for Fred with a count determiner are 
cases of conversion, from mass to count. 
Nota bene: some common nouns, like immortality, are not gradable and hence are neither 
mass nor count: *a lot of immortality, *many immortalities.
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By contrast, a non-gradable adjective will generally give rise to a nominal 
expression that is not a mass expression: immortal is not gradable (*more / 
*less immortal), hence neither is immortality (*more / *less immortality).4 
Likewise, if the original expression is a verbal expression, it must be gradable, 
i.e. accept the comparatives more and less. Now, telic verbal expressions are not 
gradable: they cannot be modified by the comparatives more and less without 
being coerced to an atelic interpretation. Telic verbal expressions are verbal 
expressions that accept duration prepositional phrases like in two hours and 
reject phrases like for two hours (Vendler, 1957; Verkuyl, 1993). The predicate 
expressed by a telic verbal expression is satisfied only if the event it describes 
has reached a set terminal point (Verkuyl, 1993). We thus understand why a 
telic predicate is not gradable: a telic predicate is either satisfied or not, but 
it cannot be satisfied more in one case than in another. One cannot eat a cake 
more than another cake (unless eat a cake is coerced into an atelic meaning, 
where it describes any part of an event of eating a cake). Hence, if a mass noun 
is derived from a verbal expression, the verbal expression must be atelic. The 
verbs to love and to work are indeed atelic, giving rise to the mass nouns love 
and work. 
Even though the condition that the original expression be gradable is 
generally sufficient, it is not always so. Thus, a gradable adjective like tall gives 
rise to the noun tallness, which is not gradable (*more / *less tallness). Also, a 
particular form of nominalization that often gives rise to a mass expression may 
fail to do so in certain cases. For instance, gradable verbs like love, respect, 
and work give rise to phonologically identical mass expressions. But the mass 
expression that corresponds to a verb like walk is not walk but walking. We will 
focus on the cases in which the original gradable expression does give rise to 
a mass expression.
In the next section, we will see what interpretations mass nouns like 
wisdom and love receive in their various uses. We want to be theory-neutral: 
the goal is to characterize the intuitions of ordinary speakers concerning how 
these nouns can be understood in their various uses. It is in section 3 that we 
will see how these intuitions can be accounted for theoretically.
4. This is true in most cases, but not always. Thus, in French, the adjective 
mortel (‘mortal’) is not gradable, cf. *plus mortel (‘more mortal’), but the derived noun 
mortalité (‘mortality’) seems to be gradable:
Il y a eu plus de mortalité sur les routes cette année que l’an passé.
‘There has been more mortality on the roads this year than last year.’
This illustrates a general fact about morphology: often, it is not possible to state necessary 
and/or sufficient conditions relating the semantic properties of a derived word and those of 
the expression it is derived from.
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2. The interpretations of mass expressions derived  
from gradable expressions
2.1. The interpretation of possessive and definite uses
Take sentences like:
(9) Julie’s wisdom attracted Tom.
(10) Julie’s love for Fred attracted Tom.
What do they mean? The subject of each sentence (Julie’s wisdom, Julie’s love 
for Fred) seems to refer to, describe, or assert the existence of, some entity 
that is said to have attracted Tom. But what kind of entity? Our intuitions, as 
ordinary speakers, are not very clear, be it concerning the meaning of these 
sentences, or the kind of entity referred to by their subject. In fact, several 
possibilities come to mind. In order to elucidate what they are, we examine 
how these sentences may be paraphrased.
A word of caution, though. Paraphrases will give us some indications 
concerning the meaning of these expressions and what they refer to (if they 
really refer to something). However, as is well known, paraphrases are a delicate 
matter. They may notably correspond to only some aspect of the meaning of 
what they paraphrase. We will have to bear this in mind in section 3, when 
discussing how to account theoretically for our intuitions concerning the 
interpretations of derived mass nouns.
According to a first intuition, the sentences above may be paraphrased 
as: the fact that Julie was wise attracted Tom; the fact that Julie loved Fred 
attracted Tom. The entity referred to by a nominal expression like Julie’s 
wisdom might thus be a fact.
According to a second intuition, the sentences may be paraphrased as: 
Tom was attracted by how wise Julie was; Tom was attracted by how much Julie 
loved Fred. Another, less natural type of paraphrase (which uses a technical 
term, degree) points in the same direction: the degree at which Julie was wise 
attracted Tom; the degree at which Julie loved Fred attracted Tom. The entity 
referred to might therefore be a degree of wisdom or love.
According to a third intuition, the sentences can be paraphrased as: how 
Julie was wise attracted Tom; how Julie loved Fred attracted Tom. Another 
equivalent paraphrase is: the way in which Julie was wise attracted Tom; the 
way in which Julie loved Fred attracted Tom. The entity referred to might 
thus be an instance (a concrete manifestation) of a property or relation5, that 
is, the particular way in which a property or relation manifests itself in a 
5. To simplify exposition, we will often talk of instances of properties, rather than 
using the more cumbersome instances of properties or relations. (Nota bene: the formal 
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given individual. (On instances of properties, see Mulligan et al., 1984; and 
Lowe, 1998, as well as section 3.2 below.)
Let us now consider other predicates than to attract and vary the 
position of the derived nominal expression (putting it for instance in the object 
position of a transitive verb). We find that some predicates license one type of 
paraphrase but not the others.
Thus, predicates like to acknowledge and to be a fact can combine with 
expressions like Julie’s love for Fred, license a paraphrase in terms of facts, but 
not the other types of paraphrases:
(11) It took Tom a long time, but he finally acknowledged Julie’s wisdom.6
(12) Julie’s love for Fred is a fact.
The first sentence can be understood as: Tom finally acknowledged the fact 
that Julie was wise. But it cannot be paraphrased as: Tom finally acknowledged 
the degree at which Julie was wise, or as: Tom finally acknowledged the way in 
which Julie was wise. Likewise for the sentence Julie’s love for Fred is a fact. 
Predicates like acknowledge and is a fact seem to require that the referent of 
Julie’s wisdom or Julie’s love for Fred be a fact.7
Second, we find that there are predicates like to describe and to admire 
that can combine with expressions like Julie’s wisdom and Julie’s love for 
Fred, license a paraphrase in terms of an instance of a property, but not the 
other types of paraphrases:
(13) Tom described Julie’s wisdom.
(14) Tom admired Julie’s love for Fred.
distinction between properties and relations is not important: properties can be seen as a 
special case of relations, namely relations that have only one argument.)
6. Adapted from a similar example given in French by Van de Velde (1995: 141).
7. Notions like factives and factive contexts have been discussed in the literature (see, 
e.g. Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1971; Delacruz, 1973). So has Vendler’s idea that gerunds of the 
form her performing the song would refer to facts (Vendler, 1968; Asher, 1993). However, 
we have found very few predicates that, with expressions like Julie’s love for Fred, license a 
paraphrase in terms of facts and clearly refuse a paraphrase in terms of instances of properties 
or relations. Consider for example factive predicates like surprise, bother and attract. These 
predicates are said to be factive because, when they take a clausal subject, they presuppose 
that the embedded sentence be true. If the sentence That Julie loved Fred surprised Tom is 
true, this entails that the sentence embedded in the subject  Julie loved Fred) is also true. 
Nonetheless, in general, these predicates accept many things as the referent of their subject, 
including ordinary people (Julie), property instances (the love that Julie felt for Fred) and 
facts (the fact that Julie loved Fred).
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In these sentences, an expression like Julie’s wisdom cannot be understood as 
meaning something like: the degree at which Julie was wise, or: the fact that 
Julie was wise. These predicates seem to license only a paraphrase in terms of 
an instance of wisdom, where the expression may be paraphrased as: the way 
in which Julie was wise.
Are there predicates that select for the paraphrase in terms of degrees? 
It seems so, at least at first sight:
(15) Julie’s wisdom exceeded Fred’s.
(16) Julie’s love for Fred was greater than her love for Tom.
These sentences seem to tell us something concerning how wise Julie was and 
how much Julie loved Fred.
Finally, we may also note the following uses:
(17) ?Julie’s wisdom lasted a week.
(18) Julie’s sadness lasted a week.
(19) Julie’s love for John lasted half a year.
The contrast between the first two sentences comes from the fact that, while 
sadness is typically a temporary property, wisdom is typically a permanent one. 
However, this contrast is far from absolute, as we can easily imagine a context 
where wisdom becomes temporary, e.g. if it is due to the effect of a drug.8
And as observed at the beginning of this section, there are predicates, 
like to attract and to surprise, which allow for any of these paraphrases:
(20) Julie’s wisdom attracted Tom.
(21) Julie’s love for Fred surprised Tom.
2.2. The interpretation of indefinite and comparative uses
Consider now uses of the nominal expression together with an indefinite 
determiner characteristic of mass nouns like much or a lot of:
(22) Julie showed much wisdom.
(23) Julie felt a lot of love for Fred.
These sentences may be paraphrased as: Julie was very wise; Julie loved Fred 
a lot. They thus express something concerning how wise Julie was, and how 
much Julie loved Fred. (We could also say, in a less natural paraphrase, that 
8. Some researchers have seen the possibility of combination with lasted a week as 
evidence that expressions like Julie’s sadness refer to a state (cf. Asher, 1993).
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they express something concerning the degree at which Julie was wise, and the 
degree at which Julie loved Fred.)
Something similar is observed when the noun is used in a compa-
rative construction:
(24) Julie showed more wisdom than Fred.
(25) Julie felt more love for Fred than for Tom.
They can be paraphrased as: Julie was wiser than Fred; Julie loved Fred more 
than Tom. They thus compare and order certain entities with respect to the 
extent at which they possess a certain property.
2.3. The interpretation of bare uses
Nominal expressions like wisdom or love can also occur bare, without 
any determiner, outside of comparative constructions:
(26) Julie encountered love.
(27) Wisdom is rare.
Acceptable paraphrases might be something like: Julie encountered someone 
who loved her, and: it is rare that someone be wise. It is noteworthy that 
no systematic procedure seems to be able to produce such paraphrases 
automatically. (In a less natural way, we could also say: Julie encountered an 
instance of love from a certain individual, and: instances of wisdom are rare.)
2.4. The interpretation of count uses
Consider now a sentence like:
(28) Julie had an incredible love for Fred.
This is a case of conversion, where the mass noun love is used as a count noun. 
Its interpretation seems to parallel that of a comparable sentence, where love is 
replaced by a concrete mass noun like wine:
(29) Julie bought an incredible wine.
This sentence says that Julie bought an instance of wine that is of a particular 
type, to which the predicate expressed by the adjective applies. Similarly, the 
sentence that concerns love says that the love felt by Julie is of a particular 
type, to which the predicate expressed by the adjective applies.
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2.5. Distributive, collective, and intermediate construals with plural 
arguments
Take an expression like Julie’s wisdom. The proper name Julie may 
be said to be the argument of the noun wisdom. Similarly in the case of an 
expression like Julie’s love for Fred, Julie and Fred may be said to be the 
arguments of the noun love.
Above, we have only considered cases where the arguments were 
singular: the expression Julie in the case of Julie’s wisdom, and the expressions 
Julie and Fred in the case of Julie’s love for Fred. We did so in order to avoid 
unnecessary complications. However, derived mass nouns can of course 
have plural arguments: the wisdom of Julie and Fred, these girls’ love for 
these boys. We now want to determine whether this makes a difference, i.e. 
whether the presence of a plural argument gives rise to more possibilities of 
interpretation.
It is well known that sentences with plurals and concrete mass nouns 
may receive so-called collective, distributive, and intermediate construals 
(cf. notably Link, 1983; Landman, 1989; Gillon, 1987, 1992, 1996). To explain 
what these construals are, we start with the case of plurals. Consider a sentence 
whose subject is a plural expression:
(30) Alice, Julie, and Mary carried this desk.
It may be true if Alice, Julie, and Mary, together, carried the desk: this is the 
collective construal. It may be true if each of the women, by herself, carried 
the desk: this is the distributive construal. It may also be true if, say, Alice and 
Julie, together, carried the desk, and Mary, by herself, also carried the desk: 
this is an intermediate construal.
As shown by Gillon (1996), a simple clause may receive collective, 
distributive, and intermediate construals as long as at least one of the arguments 
of the verb is a plural expression. The plural argument may be the subject, the 
object or the indirect object of the verb, or the object of a prepositional phrase 
complementing the verb. Thus,
(31) Bill shuffled the face cards and the non-face cards
may be understood as: Bill shuffled the face cards with the non-face cards, 
or for instance as: Bill shuffled the face cards and Bill shuffled the non-face 
cards.
The specific meanings of the verbal expression and its arguments, 
combined with knowledge of the world and context of speech, may render a 
type of construal implausible. Consider an attributive sentence with a gradable 
adjective, like sad:
(32) These men are sad.
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A distributive construal is strongly favored: the sentence is true because each 
man is sad. This is typically the case with gradable adjectives. However, a 
collective construal is also possible, when the property expressed by the 
adjective can be attributed to a group as a whole. Thus, watching a basketball 
game of the Pistons of Detroit, one may say:
(33) These men are strong tonight.
The sentence may be true because the group of men, as a whole, is strong 
(while each man, by himself, is not), or it may be true because each of the men 
is strong. Moreover, suppose the Pistons are playing the Pacers from Indiana. 
Then the sentence These men are strong tonight may be used to refer to all the 
men on the playground, and it may be made true because the Pistons, as a team, 
are strong, and the Pacers, as a team, are also strong.
Collective, distributive and intermediate construals also arise within 
complex noun phrases, independently of verbs. They can obtain with any 
prepositional phrase. The expression the suitcases in the bedroom and the 
vestibule is typically understood in a distributive manner, where it is equivalent 
to the suitcases in the bedroom and the suitcases in the vestibule (since 
a suitcase cannot be at the same time in the bedroom and in the vestibule). 
On the other hand, the expression the children of John, Mary and Fred may 
receive an intermediate construal, and denote the children that John and Mary 
have together and the children of Fred.
What precedes also applies to concrete mass nouns, as the following 
examples testify:
(34) The wine costs fifteen euros.
(35) The furniture is in the bedroom and the vestibule.
(36) The furniture in the bedroom and the vestibule
(37) The furniture of these people
A sentence with a concrete mass noun may receive collective, distributive, 
and intermediate construals (modulo the meaning of the particular lexical 
items composing the sentence, context of speech and knowledge of the world). 
And so may a noun phrase containing a prepositional group, like the furniture 
of these people.
Let us now show that the above facts are mirrored when we focus on the 
interpretation of derived mass nouns. It seems that one can appropriately use a 
noun phrase like the sadness of these men only when each man is sad; that is, 
a distributive construal of the noun phrase is strongly favored. This is typically 
the case with derived mass nouns. However, an expression like the strength of 
these men may be used when each man is strong, or when the group of men, 
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considered as a whole, is strong. It may thus receive a distributive construal, 
or a collective construal. It may also receive an intermediate construal, if, 
say, these men denotes the Pistons from Detroit and the Pacers from Indiana. 
A collective or an intermediate construal is possible when the property 
expressed by the derived mass noun can be attributed to a group as a whole.
What we just said can be substantiated in more detail by considering 
complete sentences. This will allow us, in particular, to control whether the 
types of paraphrases discussed in section 2.1 are all available. If it were not the 
case, this would constitute a significant fact, which an appropriate theoretical 
account would need to explain. We saw that a sentence like Tom was attracted 
by Julie’s wisdom may be paraphrased in three ways: in terms of facts (Tom 
was attracted by the fact that Julie was wise), in terms of degrees (e.g. Tom 
was attracted by how wise Julie was), and in terms of instances of properties 
(e.g. Tom was attracted by the way in which Julie was wise). As we see below, 
these types of paraphrases are all attested when the argument of the derived 
noun is a plural expression.
Sentences like the following may indeed be paraphrased in terms of 
facts:
(38) The sadness of the girls surprised Fred.
 ‘The fact that these girls were sad surprised Fred.’
(39) The indignation of the journalists at these news had no effect.
 ‘The fact that the journalists were indignant at these news had no effect.’
(Nota bene: other types of paraphrases are also available.) Paraphrases in terms 
of degrees are accessible with sentences like:
(40) The sadness of the boys was extreme.
 ‘These boys were extremely sad.’
 ‘The degree at which each boy was sad was extreme.’
(41) The strength of these men was incredible.
 ‘These men were incredibly strong.’
 ‘The degree at which these men were strong was incredibly high.’
And the sentences below may be paraphrased in terms of instances of 
properties:
(42) John remembered the nervousness that Lucy and Mary had shown that 
evening.
 ‘John remembered how Lucy and Mary had been nervous that evening.’
 ‘John remembered the way in which Lucy and Mary had been nervous that 
evening.’
(43) The sadness of these boys was terrible to see.
 ‘How these boys were sad was terrible to see.’
 ‘The way in which these boys were sad was terrible to see.’
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This completes our description of the data concerning the uses and interpretations 
of derived mass nouns. Let us now see how these data can be accounted for.
3. Theoretical foundations for a semantics of derived mass nouns
3.1. Methodological considerations 
How can we account theoretically for the data presented above? As 
said in the introduction, a number of issues must be addressed, which can 
be labelled as follows: reference; distributive, collective, and intermediate 
construals; gradability; and link between noun and adjective or verb.
From a methodological point of view, we think it is best to consider 
these issues independently from one another. That is, each type of phenomenon 
should be first considered on its own, to see what is needed in order to account 
for it. Then of course, we should see how the various theoretical ingredients 
can be integrated with one another. In particular, to find out what is the link 
between the semantics of a verb or adjective and the semantics of the noun 
derived from it, we should assess independently what the semantics of each 
is.
Before doing so, let us consider briefly two issues that have not yet 
been mentioned, because we think that they are peripheral: genericity, and 
Davidsonian versus classical frameworks. Concerning genericity, we follow 
Gillon (1990). He defends the view that bare uses of mass nouns or plurals 
are indefinite uses (whose interpretation is an existential one), and that what is 
called genericity corresponds to a variety of independent phenomena, which 
are neither restricted, nor specially attached, to bare uses. For alternative views, 
see for instance Carlson (1977) and Wilkinson (1991). Whatever the theory, it 
must account for the existential interpretations of bare mass nouns and plurals. 
Following Gillon, we take these to be basic.
Let us mention just one point here. It has been remarked that bare plurals, 
depending on context, may receive a universal or an existential interpretation:
(44) Mohan loves puppies.
 ‘Mohan loves all the puppies that exist.’
(45) Mohan owns puppies.
 ‘Mohan owns some of the puppies that exist.’
The factor determining the construal of the bare plural seems to be extra-
grammatical (Gillon, 1990: 153-155). It rests on the fact that one believes that, 
while someone may love all puppies, no one owns, or is likely to own, all 
puppies. Gillon suggests a unified explanation of the two cases. In each case, 
the sentence asserts that there are puppies such that Mohan Vs them (i.e. loves 
them or owns them). What the relevant set of puppies is depends on the meaning 
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of the verb, context of speech, and knowledge of the world. The universal 
construal of the first sentence concerns a set of puppies that includes all the 
puppies that exist. The existential construal of the second sentence concerns a 
restricted set of puppies, which includes only some of the puppies that exist. 
However, an existential construal of the first sentence is clearly possible, and 
a universal interpretation of the second sentence is possible: after all, it could 
be that there are puppies, corresponding to all the puppies that exist, such 
that Mohan owns them. This phenomenon is akin to the possibility of domain 
variation observed with noun phrases like all the puppies. The sentence Mohan 
loves all the puppies can be understood either as meaning: Mohan loves all the 
puppies that exist, or: Mohan loves all the puppies of a contextually determined 
subset of the set of all the puppies that exist.
Let us now consider the question of Davidsonian versus classical 
frameworks for predicates like verbs and adjectives. In a classical framework, 
a verb like to love denotes a function from couples (x,y) to truth-values: 
x loves y is true if and only if love(x,y). The arguments of the function love 
are those that are mentioned in the sentence x loves y. In a (neo)-Davidsonian 
framework, the verb denotes a function from triples (e,x,y) to truth-values: 
x loves y is true if and only if e love(e,x,y), that is, if and only if there exists 
an eventuality (in this case, a state) of x loving y. The function love receives 
an additional, eventuality argument, which is not mentioned in the sentence 
x loves y. This is done in order to account for adverbial modification, certain 
types of anaphora, nominalization, and verbs of perception (Parsons, 1990). 
However, in his survey of the discussions on this topic, Landman (2000: 
ch. 1, and ch. 3, section 3.4) reaches a number of negative conclusions. First, 
neither anaphora (ch. 1, section 1.5) nor nominalization (ch. 1, section 1.4) nor 
perception verbs (ch. 1, section 1.6) offer by themselves evidence in favor of 
a Davidsonian framework. For Landman (2000: viii), the only robust piece of 
evidence is provided by the facts about adverbial modification, the so-called 
permutation and drop entailments. Second, Landman (ch. 3, section 3.4) 
concludes that even this does not force a decision to adopt either a classical or a 
Davidsonian framework for verbs and adjectives. To these negative conclusions, 
let us add the following remarks. First, concerning adverbial modification, 
only certain adverbs authorize permutation and drop entailments, contrary to 
what one should expect in a Davidsonian framework. Landman himself draws 
a parallel between adverbs and adjectives. It is well known that, with respect to 
similar permutation and drop entailments, adjectives come into various classes: 
intersective, subsective, and privative. However, most theorists have proposed 
to account for these differences in terms of meaning postulates (Partee, 2005), 
rather than with a hidden variable. The same solution can be adopted in the 
case of adverbs. Second, using a hidden variable for eventualities to account 
for adverbial modification yields various difficulties, as shown by Moltmann 
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(2007, section 5). For instance, in a Davidsonian framework, how should one 
account for Mary dances slowly very elegantly, where, on one understanding 
of the sentence, what is very elegant is not Mary’s dancing simpliciter, but 
Mary’s dancing slowly? Third, adopting a Davidsonian framework not only 
for verbs, but also for adjectives, soon yields a proliferation of eventuality 
arguments, as shown by Larson and Segal (1995: ch. 12). And fourth, we hold 
that Davidsonianism obscures, rather than illuminates, the semantic effect 
of nominalization. As said above, to find out what is the link between the 
semantics of a verb or adjective and the semantics of the noun derived from 
it, we should assess independently what the semantics of each is. In a (neo)-
Davidsonian framework, this is prejudged: an expression like the love of x 
for y is said to refer to the eventuality that is existentially quantified over in the 
sentence x loves y. For all these reasons, we will use a classical framework for 
verbs and adjectives in what follows.
Let us come back to the issues that are our main concern: reference; 
distributive, collective, and intermediate construals; and gradability. These are 
central issues that must be dealt with when proposing a semantics for mass 
nouns, be they concrete or derived. As we will show below, dealing with each 
issue brings a certain element in the model. Reference is accounted for by 
having the noun denote entities of a certain type. Distributive, collective, and 
intermediate construals are accounted for by rules for the interpretation of 
simple clauses and complex noun phrases. And gradability is accounted for 
by associating to the predicate an ordering relation and additional mechanisms 
for certain types of use. When we focus on concrete mass nouns, we come 
up quite naturally with such answers. When we concentrate on derived mass 
nouns, we may also propose answers of the same type. Indeed, the data 
presented in section 2 show striking parallelisms between verb or adjective and 
derived mass noun with respect to gradability, and distributive, collective, and 
intermediate construals. Whatever mechanisms are responsible for gradability 
and these construals with gradable verbs or adjectives, these mechanisms must 
be somehow inherited by the derived noun. What about reference? Do derived 
mass nouns refer, and if so, to what entities? It is to these questions that we 
now turn. Once these questions are settled, we will see how to account for 
distributive, collective, and intermediate construals with concrete mass nouns 
and plurals (section 3.4); and how to account for the gradability of various 
types of predicates (section 3.5). Then, in section 4, we will see how these 
theoretical ingredients mesh together, and provide a complete semantics for 
derived mass nouns.
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3.2. Is reference illusory?
Consider again two examples of section 2.1:
(46) Julie’s wisdom attracted Tom.
(47) Julie’s love for Fred attracted Tom.
Grammatically, their subjects are definite descriptions. Now, in the case of 
nouns that concern material entities, definite descriptions (Julie’s wine, Julie’s 
cat) are paradigmatic cases of singular terms. A singular term is an expression 
that refers to (or asserts the existence of) a single entity. So, are Julie’s wisdom 
and Julie’s love for Fred singular terms? That is, does each refer to a single 
entity? Given that Julie’s wine and Julie’s cat are singular terms, one would be 
tempted to answer yes.
However, according to researchers like Dummett (1973: ch. 4), we 
should not do so: uses of expressions like Julie’s wisdom are mere façons de 
parler. Indeed, derived mass nouns, contrary to genuine singular terms, fail to 
supply what Frege called a criterion of identity. Dummett explains this notion 
as follows: « If we are to understand an expression as standing for an object, 
then we must be able, in Frege’s vivid phrase, to recognize the object as the 
same again: we must, that is, know under what circumstance some other term 
will stand for the same object » (1973: 73). A singular term is an expression 
that supplies, as part of its meaning, a criterion of identity for the entities it 
applies to. But, according to Dummett, expressions like wisdom and love do 
not supply such a principle. We do not know what entity would be named by 
Julie’s wisdom, so that we may recognize that the same entity is referred to in 
another circumstance. If we were talking of Julie’s wisdom twenty years ago, 
when she was ten years old, and if we again talk of her wisdom now, when 
she is thirty, are we talking of the same thing, of the very same entity? For 
Dummett, we do not know, and this question is in fact nonsense.
Dummett’s position is based on certain ontological intuitions and 
semantic considerations. He finds it obvious that there cannot exist an entity 
like Julie’s wisdom. According to him, we do not know what it could be, in 
particular since we have no idea what criterion of identity could decide when 
two “wisdoms” are the same or different. Dummett also presupposes that a 
genuine singular term must supply a criterion of identity.
However, these intuitions and considerations are subject to debate. 
For instance, Mulligan et al. (1984) and Lowe (1998) accept instances 
of properties in their ontologies. (Instances of properties have also been 
called moments, tropes, abstract particulars, individual accidents, or modes. 
Mulligan et al. prefer the term moment, while Lowe prefers the term mode.) 
An instance of a property (or relation) is a particular way in which a property 
is instantiated in some entity, a concrete manifestation of that property in this 
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entity (Lowe, 1998: 78). An instance of a property is thus a dependent particular: 
a particular that depends for its existence on the existence of other particulars. 
As a particular, it is rooted in space, time and the causal order. Consider a 
solid material object, such as a rubber ball. It will be shaped in a particular 
way and colored in a particular way at any given time. Suppose the rubber ball 
is spherical (with a certain radius of curvature) and red (with a certain hue). 
The ball’s sphericity is then an instance of the property of sphericity, and the 
ball’s redness is an instance of the property of redness. Likewise, if Julie is 
wise, the property of wisdom will be instantiated in Julie in a particular way. 
Julie’s wisdom is then the particular and concrete way in which the property 
of wisdom manifests itself in Julie. Lowe (1998: 78-83) insists that one of the 
characteristics of instances of properties is that they lack a definite criterion of 
identity.
So, which position should semanticians adopt? In fact, semanticians 
need not base their semantic theories on ontological considerations. They 
may feel fundamentally unconcerned by the metaphysical question « What 
does really exist? », and be uncommitted concerning what answer should 
ultimately be given to it. After all, it seems that ordinary people do manage 
to refer to persons, towns and rivers, even though philosophers disagree as to 
whether persons, towns and rivers really exist or not. It is in questions like the 
following that semanticians are interested. How are such and such expressions 
used? How are they interpreted in their various uses? And what is the best way 
to account for these uses and interpretations? So semanticians may adopt the 
following methodological principle: unless there is convincing evidence to the 
contrary, expressions that seem to be used and interpreted in the same way 
should be modeled with the same syntactic and semantic mechanisms. Thus, a 
semantic theory may say that Julie’s wisdom, just like Julie’s wine, refers to 
(or describes, or asserts the existence of) a certain entity. This entity therefore 
appears in the metalanguage of the theory. At the same time, semanticians may 
remain completely uncommitted as to whether, in the final, scientific analysis 
of how the world is structured, there really exist such entities or not.
The attitude just advocated is one of metaphysical neutrality. It is close 
to the idea put forth by Bach (1986) and Asher (1993), that semanticians should 
study natural language metaphysics, that is, identify the entities that natural 
language refers to and quantifies over. It is compatible with some attitudes 
that are metaphysically more committed. Thus, it is compatible with a realist 
position (like Lowe’s): one that claims real existence for the entity referred to 
by an expression like Julie’s wisdom, e.g., an instance of a property, a concrete 
manifestation of wisdom in Julie.
It may also be compatible (under some interpretation) with what has 
been called a fictionalist attitude: given its grammatical form, a sentence 
containing the expression Julie’s wisdom purports to refer to an entity; but it is 
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in fact typically used to convey a different proposition, which may be captured 
by a suitable paraphrase. As shown by Rosen (2005), this kind of attitude 
may be ascribed to Jeremy Bentham, who developed the notion of a fictional 
entity. “A real entity is an entity to which, on the occasion and for the purposes 
of discourse, existence is really meant to be ascribed. A fictional entity is an 
entity to which, though by the grammatical form of the discourse employed in 
speaking of it, existence is ascribed, yet in truth and reality, existence is not 
meant to be ascribed” (Bentham, 1842, vol. 8: 195). For example, when we say 
that John is under an obligation to do this, the word obligation is a common 
noun, so it purports to refer to some entity. But, according to Bentham, no one 
would suggest that in making such a claim we commit ourselves to the view 
that in reality there exists a thing, an obligation, under which John is. Given 
its literal meaning, the sentence John is under an obligation to do this purports 
to refer to a certain entity, an obligation. But speaker and hearer know that 
the sentence is typically used to convey a different proposition, which may be 
captured by a suitable paraphrase, viz., John will suffer pain or loss of pleasure 
unless he does this. This paraphrase “may be regarded as giving, not the literal 
meaning of the original claim, but rather the sober truth […] the original is 
typically used to convey” (Rosen, 2005: 53).
However, the attitude of metaphysical neutrality is clearly incompatible 
with (what has been called) a reductionist attitude. For a reductionist, a 
sentence like Tom admired Julie’s wisdom does not even purport to refer to 
a certain entity. The sentence is directly understood in terms of a suitable 
paraphrase, viz., Tom admired how Julie was wise. This paraphrase gives, and 
exhausts, the meaning of the original sentence. This seems to be the stance of 
Dummett (1973: 72).
Now, as Alston (1958) and Varzi (2002) insist, a good paraphrase has 
no intrinsic direction. If sentence A can be adequately paraphrased by sentence 
B, then sentence B may be adequately paraphrased by sentenced A. Which 
of the two sentences, then, is fundamental, i.e. captures the “ontological 
commitments” of both sentences, to use Quine’s expression? It is of course 
possible to choose one way or the other, depending on one’s ontological 
preferences. However, in line with what was said above, we think it better, as 
a semantician, to remain in a position of metaphysical neutrality. Even if two 
sentences are adequate paraphrases of one another, there is no need to reduce 
one to the other. It suffices to explain what the meaning of each is, and how 
these meanings are related, in a way that ensures that both sentences are true in 
the same situations. Indeed, identity of truth conditions does not imply identity 
of sense!
In brief, we take it that reference is not illusory, at least not in the 
sense intended by the reductionist. A sentence where an expression like Julie’s 
wisdom occurs refers, or makes as if to refer, to some entity, thereby introducing 
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a referent in the discourse. For the semantic machinery of language, whether 
this entity is ultimately real or not makes no difference.
3.3. What do derived mass nouns refer to?
At this point, let us indicate a variety of positions that are logically 
possible concerning the reference of derived mass nouns.
Definite descriptions like Julie’s wisdom and Julie’s love for Tom
A) have no fixed meaning: it is only the linguistic and extra-linguistic 
context that allows us to interpret them;
B) have fixed meanings: they are ambiguous;
C) have one fixed meaning: they really or primarily refer to entities of 
a certain type, but they may be coerced to refer to entities of another type in 
certain contexts; thus, they really or primarily refer to:
C.1) facts;
C.2) degrees (Tovena, 2001)9; 
C.3) instances of properties (Nicolas, 2002a, 2002b, 2004; 
Moltmann, 2004)10;
C.4) states (Parsons, 1990; Asher, 1993).
Approach A) denies that an expression like Julie’s wisdom has any fixed 
meaning or meanings. A noun like wisdom or love is derived from an adjective 
or a verb. On this approach, the derivation would have no systematic effect. It 
would be only in the context of a specific utterance that the expression could be 
understood. This understanding would involve finding, given the context, an 
appropriate paraphrase that uses the original adjective or verb. With respect to 
the ontological attitudes evoked earlier, this approach may seem congenial to 
reductionism, and perhaps also to fictionalism. It may also be seen as a purely 
linguistic thesis concerning the interpretation of conversions of a gradable 
adjective or verb into a noun. However, the intuitions evoked in section 2.1 
are much more systematic than this position predicts them to be. Approach A), 
9. Tovena does not take into consideration definite uses and so does not try to account 
for them. But her remarks (Tovena, 2001: 575) suggest that she would agree to say that derived 
mass nouns like wisdom denote degrees. Let us also mention that Tovena is concerned with 
a class of nouns that is not exactly identical to ours. She considers what Van de Velde (1995) 
calls intensive nouns. These nouns are characterized semantically, by the fact that their 
quantification does not concern a quantity of matter or time, but intensity. Expressions like 
love and respect are thus included in this semantic class. So are nouns derived from gradable 
adjectives, like wisdom and sadness. But nouns derived from verbs denoting processes, like 
work and sleep, are not, since, according to Van de Velde, their quantification concerns a 
quantity of time.
10. Of course, several philosophers have also defended this view; see for instance, 
Mulligan et al. (1984) and Lowe (1998).
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which says that the interpretation of derived mass nouns is a function of the 
semantic and pragmatic context, thus appears to be empirically inadequate.
Approach B) claims that an expression like Julie’s wisdom or Julie’s love 
for Fred has several meanings: it is ambiguous between various types of 
interpretations, perhaps in terms of facts, degrees, and instances of properties. 
It can be contrasted with approach C), which claims that these expressions 
primarily refer to entities of a certain type (they are not ambiguous), but they 
may be coerced to refer to entities of another type in certain contexts.
How can we adjudicate between ambiguity versus a primary meaning 
sometimes supplemented by coercion? Both approaches are consistent with 
the data, and so the choice is a difficult one. For the sake of simplicity, we 
adopt approach C.3): derived mass nouns are not ambiguous, and they refer 
to instances (i.e. concrete manifestations) of properties or relations. Let us see 
how this hypothesis accounts for our intuitions concerning the interpretations 
of derived mass nouns. We saw that different types of paraphrases were 
available depending on the type of predicate used in the sentence. This can 
now be explained:
– Predicates like to surprise in Julie’s love for Tom surprised Fred: 
something may surprise us for a variety of reasons. It may surprise us because 
of its mere existence (this corresponds to the paraphrase in terms of a fact: the 
fact that Julie loved Fred surprised Tom), because of its position with respect to 
a certain ordering (this corresponds to the paraphrases in terms of a “degree”: 
Tom was surprised by how wise Julie was, the degree at which Julie loved 
Fred surprised Tom), or because of something else.11 All these cases are thus 
covered in a simple and uniform way (with no coercion taking place here) if 
we hypothesize that the subject of to surprise is an instance of a property, an 
instance of love.
– Predicates like to acknowledge in Fred finally acknowledged 
Julie’s love for Tom: the verb requires its direct object to denote a fact, as 
evidenced by the following example: John acknowledged the problem, which 
means that John acknowledged the fact that the problem existed. In these two 
examples, it is therefore plausible to hypothesize that coercion is taking place: 
the meaning of the direct object of the verb is coerced, so that it receives, in 
this context, a novel interpretation in terms of a fact.12
11. Zucchi (1993: 184) makes a similar remark concerning the alleged ambiguity of a 
sentence like Mary’s resignation surprised us, often claimed to have an event reading and a 
fact reading.
12. Asher (1993: 159, 162) holds a similar view. He takes a derived nominal like 
the collapse of the Germans to denote primarily an event, but to take on a new meaning, in 
terms of a fact, in contexts like: The collapse of the Germans is a fact. Likewise, he takes an 
expression like John’s honesty to denote primarily a state, but to take on a new meaning in a 
context like John’s honesty is well known.
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– Predicates like to describe in Fred described Julie’s love for Tom: by 
hypothesis, an expression like Julie’s love for Tom denotes an instance of love, 
a concrete manifestation of a property. It is therefore something that can be 
described (or, say, admired).
– Predicates like greater than in Julie’s love for Tom was greater than her 
love for Fred: this sentence compares two instances of love using an ordering 
relation associated with the adjective great. Given the vague meaning of great, 
this may then be understood as comparing the two instances of love using the 
ordering relation associated with the noun love and the verb to love. Hence the 
possibility of a paraphrase using the term degree: the degree at which Julie 
loved Tom was greater than the degree at which she loved Fred. 
– Predicates like to last in Julie’s love for Tom lasted half a year: 
an instance of a property is a concrete entity, a concrete manifestation of 
a property. It can subsist over time, hence the possibility of employing the 
predicate to last.13
Let us now see how the distributive, collective, and intermediate 
construals of concrete mass nouns and plurals may be accounted for. We will 
then see how gradability can be modelled. This will complete our discussion of 
the theoretical foundations needed in order to provide a complete semantics for 
derived mass nouns. We will make this semantics explicit in section 4.
3.4. Distributive, collective, and intermediate construals of concrete 
mass nouns and plurals
Take a concrete mass noun like wine or furniture. Definite descriptions, 
like the wine, can be used to refer to entities of certain kind. This can be 
accounted for by saying that a noun like wine denotes entities of a certain kind, 
namely, instances of wine. This also explains the interpretation of indefinite 
descriptions like some wine, which are taken to quantify existentially over 
instances of wine. 
Moreover, sentences where a concrete mass noun or a plural appears 
may receive distributive, collective, and intermediate construals. This can be 
accounted for by positing, with Gillon (1990, 1992, 1996), a certain rule for the 
interpretation of simple clauses. Gillon’s account has two main assets. First, 
contrary to other authors (e.g. Link, 1983; Landman, 1989), Gillon postulates 
no hidden operator in order to derive these construals: this is done by a rule 
13. Asher (1993, 162) suggests that in such sentences, Julie’s love for Tom refers to a 
state that lasts for a certain period. However, states can be seen as special cases of instances 
of properties or relations: if there is a state that corresponds to Julie’s love for Tom, then this 
state would seem to be an instance of love, an instance of a property or relation. The notion 
of an instance of a property or relation thus appears to be more general than the notion of a 
state, also encompassing processes and events as special cases (Mulligan, 1999: 170).
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for the interpretation of simple clauses, like The furniture is in these rooms. 
Second, this is easily generalized to other cases, which show a similar behavior, 
notably complex noun phrases containing a preposition, like the furniture in 
these rooms (Gillon, 1996). To derive the conditions of application of such 
complex noun phrases, other theories have to postulate more hidden machinery, 
something that is undesirable since it can be prevented.
Let us see how Gillon’s account works. We follow him quite closely, but 
introduce a few technical modifications to ensure that everything works nicely 
for both plurals and mass nouns. We begin, for ease of exposition, with the case 
of plural count nouns. Suppose that, in a given circumstance, there are only 
three men we can talk about: a, b, and c. Then the denotation of the singular 
count noun man in the circumstance is [man] = {a, b, c}, while the denotation 
of the plural count noun men is [men] = {a, b, c, a+b, b+c, c+a, a+b+c}. The 
sign ‘+’ is used for mereological sums. Thus, a+b+c is the mereological sum of 
a, b and c. a+b+c can be thought of as a, b and c taken together. Since a, b and 
c are concrete objects (each is a man), their sum is also a concrete object. (For 
more on mereology, see Simons, 1987.)
Mereology allows us to represent collective construals easily. If a man 
b carries a piano p, we may represent that as C(b,p), where C corresponds to 
the relation of carrying. If three men a, b and c jointly carry a piano p, we may 
represent that as C(a+b+c,p): the relation C holds between a, b and c taken 
together (a+b+c) and p. This is not enough, however, as intermediate construals 
must also be accounted for. To do so, we need a notion of M-covering. (Gillon 
uses a notion of aggregation, which is defined a bit differently. The difference 
is purely technical; both notions play exactly the same role.)
Let M be a plural count noun or a singular mass noun. A set X is an 
M-covering of a set Z if and only if these two conditions are satisfied:
i) X is a subset of the denotation of M: X  [M]
ii) The mereological sum of the elements of X is identical to the 
mereological sum of the elements of Z.
For example, in the situation described just earlier, the denotation of the 
plural count noun men was {a, b, c, a+b, b+c, c+a, a+b+c}, and the denotation 
of these men was {a+b+c}. The set X = {a+b, b+c} is a men-covering of 
[these men] since X is included in [men] and (a+b)+(b+c) = a+b+c.
Take now a sentence like:
(48) These men carried these pianos.
« The essential idea is that a predicate is evaluated, not with respect to the 
denotation of a […] noun phrase which is its argument, but with respect to the 
elements in a [covering] constructed from the […] noun phrase’s denotation, 
where the choice of [covering] is determined by one’s knowledge of the world 
and one’s context » (Gillon 1996: 461). Since the sentence (48) contains two 
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plural noun phrases, two coverings must be chosen. Let X be the chosen men-
covering of [these men], and Y the chosen pianos-covering of [these pianos]. 
Then the sentence is true, relative to this choice of coverings, if and only if:
– for all x in X, there is a y in Y such that C(x,y);
– for all y in Y, there is an x in X such that C(x,y).
Suppose that in (48), these men denotes {a+b+c} and these pianos 
denotes {p+q}. Let the chosen coverings be X = {a, b+c} and Y = {p,q}. Then 
the sentence is true if either C(a,p)  C(b+c,q), i.e. a carried p while b and c 
carried q together, or C(a,q)  C(b+c,p).
Finally, consider:
(49) These men carried this furniture.
The direct object of to carry is the mass noun phrase this furniture. Suppose the 
furniture present in the circumstance is a desk d, a lamp l and a table t. Then 
the denotation of furniture is {d, l, t, d+l, l+t, t+d, d+l+t}, while the denotation 
of this furniture is {d+l+t}. The rule of interpretation given above applies, 
and yields a similar range of construals as for the sentence These men carried 
these pianos.
For the moment, we have only considered simple clauses containing a 
verb. However, as shown by Gillon (1996), and as seen in section 2.5, there 
are other complex expressions that express a predication. This is the case in 
particular of complex noun phrases containing prepositions, like the children 
of these people. Here, the preposition of expresses a relation O (the relation 
of being a child of) that holds between some of the children and some of the 
people. The denotation of the complex noun phrase depends on the denotation 
of the second argument of the preposition (these people). In parallel with the 
rule for simple clauses, Gillon (1996: 465) proposes the following rule of 
interpretation for such complex noun phrases.
The denotation D of the children of these  people is the set containing the 
largest mereological sum of children such that there is a children-covering X 
over D and a people-covering Y over [these people] satisfying the conditions:
– for all x in X, there is a y in Y such that O(x,y);
– for all y in Y, there is an x in X such that O(x,y).
Suppose for instance that these people denotes Y = {p+q+r}, and that 
p and q have, together, one child a, while r has two children, b and c. Then, 
the denotation of the children of these people is D = {a+b+c}. This is indeed 
the largest sum of children that satisfies the conditions above. It does so in the 
following way: the children-covering X over {a+b+c} is {a,b,c}, the people-
covering Y over {p+q+r} is {pq,r}, and we have: O(a,pq)  O(b,r)  O(c,r).
The same rule of interpretation applies for instance to the furniture in 
these rooms, with the relation of being in.
Let us now turn to the issue of modeling gradability.
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3.5. Gradability
In all the major parts of speech, we find expressions that are gradable, 
i.e. expressions that accept the comparatives more and less. How should we 
account for gradability? Semantically, what is the common core behind all 
instances of gradability? And beyond this common core, are they notable 
semantic differences, so that more specific mechanisms are operating 
in certain uses of gradable predicates? (The research on gradability has 
focused on gradable adjectives. For reviews of the literature, see particularly 
von Stechow (1984) and Klein (1991), as well as Kennedy (1999) and Kennedy 
& McNally (2005).)
We find gradable expressions among:
– plural count nouns (more cats), but not singular count nouns (*more 
cat);
– mass nouns, be they concrete (more wine, less furniture), or derived 
(more sadness, less love, more work);
– adjectives: taller, less sad;
– verbs: to love less, to work more.
While all plural count nouns and all mass nouns are gradable, this is 
neither the case for all common nouns (*more immortality, *more immortalities), 
nor for all adjectives (*more immortal), nor for all verbs (*to die more).
With respect to gradability, the following uses of gradable predicates 
are especially important to consider: 
– comparative uses (cf. above);
– modified uses:
* imprecise: many cats, much wine, a lot of wisdom, very wise, to love 
a lot, to work much;
* precise: only some gradable predicates have what we call a precise 
modified use, a use where a precise measure is made: two cats, three liters 
of wine, four pieces of furniture, to work five hours;
– unmodified uses, where the predicate is used by itself: Cats were 
fighting in the street; John drank wine; Julie showed wisdom; Julie loved 
Fred; Julie worked.
The interpretation of these uses can be roughly described as follows.
– Comparative uses: an ordering (possibly incomplete) is imposed on 
objects according to whether one object possesses the relevant property to 
greater or less extent than another (cf. Klein, 1991).
– Unmodified uses: the predicate attributes a property to its argument(s). 
In most cases, this property is fixed (cats, wine, furniture, to love, love, to work, 
work, sad, sadness); in other cases (tall, wise, wisdom), this property depends 
on context.
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Let us comment on this distinction (which concerns expressions used 
literally). In many cases, it is clear that there is no context dependence. Thus, 
whether something is wine or not is independent of context; so is whether Julie 
works or not (if the expression is used literally); whether she is sad or not; 
and whether she loves Bill or not. On the contrary, whether Julie is tall or not 
depends on context. It depends on how tall is understood: e.g., is she tall for a 
ten-year-old girl, or tall for a professional basketball player? Similarly, is Fred 
wise for kid, or wise for a French man? The following contrasts confirm this 
distinction.
(50) ?? Fred is sad for a kid.
(51) ?? Fred felt sadness for a kid.
(52) ?? Fred loved Mary for a friend.
(53) ?? Fred showed love for Mary for a friend.
(54) Fred is tall for a kid / for a French man.
(55) Fred is wise for a kid / for a French man.
(56) Fred showed wisdom for a kid / for a French man.
It seems that the gradable predicates whose unmodified use is interpreted in a 
contextually dependent manner come (mostly or all) from a subset of gradable 
adjectives (tall, wise), or are derived from these (wisdom). (In his work on 
gradable adjectives, Kennedy has made extensive use of this distinction; cf. for 
instance Kennedy & McNally (2005). He uses the terms relative and absolute, 
relative gradable adjectives being those whose unmodified use is interpreted in 
a contextually dependent manner.)
– Modified uses:
* Imprecise: an object is said to possess a property to a certain extent, 
which is indicated only imprecisely, and in a manner that crucially depends 
on context (cf. work a lot); the object is thus said to belong to a contextually 
determined set.
* Precise: an object is said to possess a property to a precisely measured 
extent.
Let us now see how we can model the interpretation of these uses. Our 
aim is to identify the simplest logical apparatus that is conceptually needed. 
Any analysis (even if it uses stronger mechanisms) will then have to yield 
truths conditions that will be equivalent with these at some level.
– Comparative uses: the simplest way to account for them is to say that a 
gradable predicate P has an associated (possibly incomplete) order relationship 
>
 P, and that the comparative use of the predicate P orders two entities, x and 
y, in a certain way: x >
 P y in the case of more P (e.g. x is more wine than y; x 
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is taller than y), and x
 
<
 P
 
y in the case of less P (e.g. x is less wine than y; x is 
less tall than y). When the predicate has several arguments, like the transitive 
verb to love, it is ordered pairs of entities that are ordered by >
 P : Julie loves 
Fred more than Bill corresponds to (j,f)
 >
 love 
(j,b).
– Unmodified uses: when we focus on the majority of cases, that is, 
on predicates whose interpretation is not contextually dependent (cats, wine, 
furniture, sad, sadness, to love, love, to work, work), the simplest way to 
account for their unmodified use is to model them as denoting a contextually 
independent set S. Or equivalently, as denoting a function from entities to 
truth-values, e.g. wine(x) for the noun wine, and love(x,y) for the verb to love. 
When we turn to those cases where the interpretation is contextually dependent, 
it is then quite natural to model them as denoting a set that is contextually 
determined. Or equivalently, as denoting a function from contexts c and entities 
x to truth-values, e.g. tall(c,x) for the adjective tall. (This is the basis of the 
strategy followed by Klein, 1980.)
– Modified uses:
* Imprecise: as above, let S be the (contextually dependent or 
independent) set determined by the bare use of the gradable predicate in the 
context of speech, c. An imprecise modified use contextually determines a 
subset S’ of S, with additional constraints that depend on the meaning of the 
modifier. For instance, a lot of wine will, in a given context c, denote a subset 
S’ of the set S of instances of wine. S’ will consist of all the instances of wine 
that can be described as a lot of wine in this context. (The following constraint 
must be respected for a lot of wine: if x is in S’ (i.e. x is a lot of wine) and y is in 
S but not in S’ (i.e. y is wine but not a lot of wine), then x
 >
 wine 
y.) Equivalently, 
we may see a lot of wine as corresponding to a function a-lot-of-wine from 
contexts c and instances of wine x to truth-values. And this function may be 
seen as the result of applying a function a-lot-of to the function wine: a-lot-of-
wine(c,x) = [a-lot-of(wine)](c,x).
* Precise: in these cases, a precise measure is made. This measure is 
not contextually dependent. This can be represented using a measure function. 
Two liters of wine will denote a subset S’ of S, such that any member x of S’ 
can be said to be two liters of wine. That is, we have something like: [liters-
of(wine)](x) = 2, where liters-of(wine) is a function from instances of wine to 
positive real numbers, which measures them in liters. Likewise, six feet tall 
will denote a subset S’ of S, such that any member x of S’ can be said to be 
six feet tall, i.e. [feet(tall)](x) = 6, where feet(tall) is a function that measures, 
in feet, how tall x is. Finally, to work two hours will denote a subset S’ of S, 
such that any member x of S’ can be said to work two hours, i.e. [hours(work)]
(x) = 2, where hours(work) if a function that measures, in hours, the amount 
of time worked by x.
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Let us summarize what these assumptions give us for some of the 
gradable predicates considered above:
(57) cats: 14
 x are cats: cats(x)
 x are more cats than y: x >
 cats y
 x are a lot of cats: [a-lot-of(cats)](c,x)
 x are two cats: [number(cats)](x) = 2
(58) wine:
 x is wine: wine(x)
 x is more wine than y: x >
 wine y
 x is a lot of wine: [a-lot-of(wine)](c,x)
 x is two liters of wine: [liters(wine)](x) = 2
(59) sad:
 x is sad: sad(x)
 x is more sad than y: x >
 sad y
 x is very sad: [very(sad)](c,x)
(60) tall:
 x is tall: tall(c,x)
 x is taller than y: x >
 tall y
 x is very tall: [very(tall)](c,x)
 x is six feet tall: [feet(tall)](x) = 6
(61) to love:
 x loves y: love(x,y)
 x loves y more than z: (x,y) >
 to love (x,z)
 x loves y a lot: [a-lot(love)](c,x,y)
(62) to work:
 x works: work(x)
 x works more than y: x >
 to work y
 x works a lot: [a-lot(work)](c,x)
 x works two hours: [hours(work)](x) = 2
Let us make several comments. Conceptually, we think it is important to 
identify the simplest logical apparatus that is needed to account for each type 
of use of a gradable predicate. Any analysis of gradable predicates will then 
have to incorporate this logical apparatus in one way or another. And if it uses 
stronger mechanisms, it will have to provide justifications for doing so.
The literature on gradability has focused on gradable adjectives. It has 
thereby approached gradability from a standpoint that is not general enough. In 
14. We do not indicate here the connections with the singular, cat, and so leave the 
predicate ‘cats’ unanalyzed.
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the studies on gradable adjectives, it has now become customary to make use 
of measure functions and degrees in order to represent all the uses of gradable 
adjectives. This is, in effect, adopting the strategy of generalizing to the worst 
case (a strategy adopted explicitly by von Stechow, 1984: 53): since precise 
modified uses require a mechanism that makes a precise measure (a measure 
function), this strong apparatus is used to account for all the uses of gradable 
adjectives. 
However, systems of precise measurement are a rather recent invention 
in the history of humankind. There have existed languages that did not express 
any precise measurement, besides elementary counting. In some languages, 
elementary counting reduces to making a distinction between, e.g., one, two, 
three, many (Greenberg, 1972). Precise modified uses are therefore restricted 
to uses like one cat, two cats, three cats. To model the semantics of gradable 
predicates in these languages, there is no need of measure functions besides a 
rudimentary cardinality function corresponding to one, two and three.
A similar case can be made concerning the conceptual development 
of children. Young children cognitively distinguish simple cardinalities. They 
are also able to perceive that one person is taller than another is, and can thus 
understand a claim like I am taller than Bill. But they do not see, nor say, that 
one person is six feet tall: precise measurement is a late achievement, both in 
cognition and in speech.
Moreover, the notion of degree is appealing only in the case of 
predicates that have precise modified uses (e.g. six feet tall), that is, in the case 
of predicates for which a precise system of measurement has been developed. 
In other cases, what can it mean? For instance, what can it mean to say that 
John is sad to degree d? No system for measuring precisely how sad people 
are is likely to be forthcoming. Therefore, as pointed out in their own ways by 
Creswell (1976) and Klein (1991), to say that John is sad to degree d is only 
a roundabout way of saying the following. The gradable predicate sad has an 
associated (perhaps incomplete) ordering relation, so that a person may be 
said to be sadder than another. One may form equivalence classes based on 
this ordering relation: two persons x and y are in the same equivalence class 
if and only if x is as sad as y, and y is as sad as x. Formally, a degree may be 
seen as such an equivalence class. Then, to say that John is sad to degree d is 
to say that John belongs to a certain equivalence class, d, with respect to the 
ordering relation associated with the gradable predicate sad. This can be done, 
but, as pointed above, there is no need of doing so, and degrees are cognitively 
implausible for young children, or for speakers of a language that can only 
express elementary counting.
For all these reasons, we have followed the strategy indicated above, 
namely, that of identifying the simplest logical apparatus that is needed to 
account for each type of use of a gradable predicate. (This is only a beginning, 
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of course: much more detailed work is needed about this. And in particular, 
which formalism is used for such or such a construction may vary from 
language to language.)
A final remark is in order. The notion of gradability, which applies to 
the members of various lexical categories, is a very general one: a sentence 
containing more or less is used to make a comparison between some entities. 
How this comparison is then made depends on the nature of the gradable 
predicate (plural count noun, mass noun, adjective, verb). In particular, it may 
depend on the type of the verb. Thus, with verbs denoting processes (to work), 
what is compared is the duration of the process. Not so with verbs denoting 
emotions (to love), where what is compared is the intensity of the emotions felt. 
These particularities are also observed with the mass nouns derived from those 
verbs (cf. Van de Velde, 1995; Nicolas, 2002a).
We have just completed the discussion of the theoretical foundations 
for a semantics of derived mass expressions. We can now put together the 
pieces of the puzzle.
4. The semantics of derived mass expressions
4.1. Reference in possessive and definite uses
Consider the sentence:
(63) Julie’s love for Tom surprised Fred.
Its subject has the same meaning as the expression the love of Julie for Tom. 
An element of definiteness is thus part of the meaning of Julie’s love for Tom. 
We take this element to be provided by an implicitly present iota operator. The 
expression Julie’s love for Tom uniquely identifies a certain instance of love. In 
a model where the referents of Julie, Tom and Fred are j, t and f respectively, 
its conditions of application are:
(64) Julie’s love for Tom: Ip [love’(p,j,t)]
(We distinguish the function corresponding to the noun love, which we note 
love’, from the function corresponding to the verb to love, which we note love.) 
And the truth-conditions of the sentence are:
(65) Julie’s love for Tom surprised Fred is true if and only if
 surprised(Ip [love’(p,j,t)], f)
Similarly with a noun like sadness, derived from a gradable adjective:
(66) Julie’s sadness surprised Tom is true if and only if
 surprised(Ip [sadness(p,j)], t)
192 DAVID NICOLAS
4.2. Distributive, collective, and intermediate construals
One of the assets of Gillon’s account is that applies easily to predications 
internal to noun phrases, in complex noun phrases like the children of 
these people or the furniture in these rooms (Gillon, 1996). His account may 
also be applied to complex noun phrases containing derived mass nouns, as we 
will now see on one example. For simplicity, we concentrate on what we take 
to be the primary reading of such noun phrases, namely, the reading in terms 
of instances of properties.
Consider the sentence: The strength of these men is impressive, said when 
watching a game opposing two teams of two people each. The interpretation 
of the unmodified use of each gradable predicate, strength and impressive, 
depends on context. Let these men denote {e+f+g+h}. Suppose that, in the 
context of speech c, the men e and f, together, are strong, but they are not so 
individually, or this is irrelevant. Likewise, imagine that in the same context of 
speech, the men g and h, together, are strong. In this context of speech c, one 
could thus speak of the strength of e and f; this would refer to a certain instance 
of strength, p, which satisfies: strength(c,p,e+f). Likewise, one could speak of 
the strength of g and h, referring to an instance of strength q, which satisfies: 
strength(c,q,g+h).
In this context, what is the denotation of the strength of these men? 
According to the rule of interpretation given by Gillon, it is the set D containing 
the largest sum of instances of strength such that there is a strength-covering X 
over D and a men-covering Y over [these men] satisfying the two conditions:
– for each x in X, there is a y in Y such that strength(c,x,y);
– for each y in Y, there is an x in X such that strength(c,x,y).
We obtain the following. The denotation of the strength of these men is 
D = {p+q}, the strength-covering X over D is {p, q}, the men-covering Y over 
[these men] is {e+f, g+h}, and we have: strength(c,p,e+f)  strength(c,q,g+h). 
p+q is indeed the largest sum of instances of strength that satisfies the conditions 
above.
Finally, the whole sentence, The strength of these men is impressive, is 
made true by the fact that: impressive(c,p)  impressive(c,q).
4.3. Gradability
We have indicated in section 3.5 what logical apparatus is needed to 
account for the main types of uses of gradable predicates. Applying this to 
derived mass nouns, which denote instances of properties or relations, we 
obtain what follows, c being the context of speech.
(67) x felt love for y is true if and only if
฀ p ( felt(x,p)  love’(p,x,y) )
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(68) x felt a lot of love for y is true if and only if
฀ p ( felt(x,p)  [a-lot(love’)](c,p,x,y) )
(69) x felt more love for y than for z is true if and only if
฀ p q ( felt(x,p)  felt(x,q)  love’(p,x,y)  love’(q,x,z)  p >
 love q )
(70) x felt sadness is true if and only if
฀ p ( felt(x,p)  sadness(p,x) )
(71) x felt a lot of sadness is true if and only if
฀ p ( felt(x,p)  [a-lot-of(sadness)](c,p,x) )
(72) x felt more sadness than y is true if and only if
฀ p q (felt(x,p)  felt(y,q)  sadness(p,x)  sadness (q,y)  p >sadnessq)
4.4. The links between derived mass noun and verb or adjective
These can now be stated. We indicate what the logical links are, which 
relate directly the functions and ordering relations associated with the derived 
noun and the gradable predicate it is derived from. Such links hold between 
any gradable verb or adjective and the mass noun derived from it. We illustrate 
them on two examples, love and sadness, which take different numbers of 
arguments.
– Links between the functions and relations associated with the verb to love 
and the noun love:
(73) x y [ love(x,y) j p ( love’(p,x,y) ) ]
฀ c x y [ [a-lot(love)](c,x,y) j p ( [a-lot(love’)](c,p,x,y) )
฀ xyz [(x,y) >to love (x,z) j pq (love’(p,x,y)  love’(q,x,z)  p > love q)]
– Links between the functions and relations associated with sad and sadness:
(74) x [ sad(x) j p (sadness(p,x) ) ]
฀ c x [ very(sad)](c,x) j p ( [a-lot-of(sadness)](c,p,x) )
฀ x y [ x >sad y j p q (sadness(p,x)  sadness(q,y)  p >sadness q) ]
5. Conclusion
The main question that we wanted to address in this paper was: are 
derived mass nouns a separate species of mass nouns, with their own semantic 
properties, or can a general account be proposed, which works both for concrete 
and derived mass nouns? We have shown that a general semantic account 
can indeed be proposed. This requires that three central issues be dealt with: 
reference; distributive, collective, and intermediate construals; and gradability. 
Reference is accounted for by having the noun denote entities of a certain 
type. Distributive, collective, and intermediate construals are accounted for 
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by Gillon’s rules for the interpretation of simple clauses and complex noun 
phrases containing a prepositional phrase. And gradability is accounted for 
by associating to the predicate an ordering relation and other mechanisms for 
certain types of uses.
When we focus on concrete mass nouns, we come up quite naturally 
with such answers. When we focus on derived mass nouns, we can also 
propose answers of the same type. But this involves first determining whether 
derived mass nouns refer to certain entities, and if so, to entities of which 
kind. Adopting the methodological stance of metaphysical neutrality, we have 
proposed that derived mass nouns do refer, or make as if to refer, instances of 
properties or relations, thereby introducing these as referents in the discourse. 
Their distributive, collective, and intermediate construals are then accounted 
for by Gillon’s rule for the interpretation of complex noun phrases. And 
gradability is explained in terms of an ordering relation and other mechanisms 
that are systematically related to those of the verb or adjective the noun is 
derived from.
We have gone to some length to determine whether sentences with 
derived mass nouns are liable to distributive, collective, and intermediate 
construals. Indeed, such data with derived mass nouns have never been 
discussed. However, they are certainly important to consider, given the 
fact that discussion of distributive, collective, and intermediate construals 
has dominated most of the research on plurals and concrete mass nouns in 
the last twenty years. We have shown that derived mass nouns are liable to 
such construals. We have then shown, again in some detail, how the account 
proposed by Gillon (1996) for plurals and concrete mass nouns applies to 
derived mass nouns. Whether this was so, indeed, could not be presumed; it 
had to be established.
We have also discussed how gradability can be accounted for. 
Gradability is a general phenomenon, which concerns each major part of 
speech. Studies of gradability have focused on gradable adjectives, thereby 
approaching gradability from a standpoint that is not general enough. To 
account for gradability, recent studies have made uniform use of the apparatus 
of measure functions and degrees. We have proposed a model in which this 
apparatus is involved only when explicitly asked for, that is, in cases of precise 
modified uses (e.g. six feet tall).
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RÉSUMÉ
Quelle est la sémantique des expressions massives comme sagesse et amour, 
qui sont dérivées d’expressions graduables (sage, aimer) ? Nous examinons 
d’abord comment ces expressions sont utilisées, puis comment elles sont 
interprétées dans leurs divers emplois. Nous montrons en particulier que, tout 
comme avec les noms massifs concrets ordinaires (vin, mobilier), les énoncés 
où elles figurent peuvent recevoir des interprétations distributives, collectives 
et intermédiaires. Nous proposons alors un modèle qui explique ces données, 
dans lequel les expressions massives dérivées dénotent des instances de 
propriétés. Le modèle est suffisamment général pour s’appliquer aussi bien aux 
noms massifs concrets qu’aux noms massifs dérivés. Ceci établit que les noms 
massifs ont une sémantique uniforme. Une autre caractéristique du modèle 
est que pour expliquer la graduabilité des expressions massives, il n’emploie 
degrés et fonctions de mesure que lorsque ceux-ci sont ouvertement exprimés, 
dans des expressions comme beaucoup de sagesse ou deux litres de vin.
MOTS-CLÉS
Noms massifs, nominalisation, propriétés, graduabilité, distributivité.
